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This paper surveys methodological issues in subnational 
credit ratings and highlights key challenges for developing 
countries. Subnational borrowing from capital markets 
has been on the rise owing to fiscal decentralization and 
demand for infrastructure investments. A prerequisite 
for accessing capital markets, subnational credit ratings 
have also emerged as a part of broader reform for 
fiscal sustainability. They facilitate a more transparent 
budgetary and financial management system. The global 
financial crisis makes subnational credit ratings more 
relevant, as they contribute to fiscal risk evaluations and 
fiscal adjustment.
This paper—a product of the Economic Policy and Debt Department, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management 
Network—is part of a larger effort in the department to develop knowledge products on subnational finance and fiscal 
reforms. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be 
contacted at lliu@worldbank.org. 
In addition to subnationals’ own credit strength, 
the creditworthiness of the sovereign and the 
intergovernmental fiscal system are among the most 
critical rating criteria. Implicit and contingent liabilities 
are integral to the rating process. Indirect debt 
instruments including off-balance-sheet financing create 
fiscal risks. The ongoing financial crisis has reinforced 
the rating focus on the management of liquidity, debt 
structure, and off-balance-sheet liabilities. 
 
Subnational Credit Ratings: A Comparative Review 
 
Lili Liu and Kim Song Tan1  
 
                                                 
1 Lili Liu is a Lead Economist with the Economic Policy and Debt Department, PREM Network, the World Bank; 
email: lliu@worldbank.org.  Kim Song Tan is a Professor at the Singapore Management University; email: 
kstan@smu.edu.sg.  We thank Santiago Herrera and Steven H. Hochman for their peer reviewing comments which 
have been incorporated.  We also thank Signe Zeitkate for her inputs summarizing research on relationship between 
credit ratings and spread of debt instruments and her comments on the paper. The findings, interpretations, and 
conclusions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent. 
The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work 
 2
Subnational Credit Ratings: A Comparative Review 
 
1. Introduction 
Subnational credit ratings are a prerequisite for subnational governments to access the capital 
market, particularly the international capital market to finance infrastructure investments. 2  
Developing countries are increasingly engaging international rating agencies to rate the 
creditworthiness of their subnational governments. As part of broad fiscal reform, subnational 
credit ratings also help enhance fiscal transparency, price risks and returns, and facilitate capital 
market participation in fiscal monitoring and surveillance. Although the ongoing global financial 
crisis has strained the subnational capital market, subnational governments have continued their 
demand for capital market financing in many emerging economies.3  In this context, subnational 
credit ratings become more relevant, as they contribute to fiscal risk evaluations and fiscal 
adjustment. The crisis has further differentiated the fiscal capacity of subnational governments. 
The evaluation of financial risks, including contingent liabilities, in all sectors – be it corporate, 
household, financial or the public sector – has become an even more important requirement for 
adjustment.     
Since 1996, the number of subnational entities rated by Standard & Poor’s (S&P) and Moody’s 
rose by over 250 percent.4  For Moody’s alone, over the ten year period from 1998 to 2008, the 
number of subnational governments rated tripled.  The most rapid increase outside the US and 
Western Europe is in Eastern Europe – from zero in 1998 to the ratings of 64 subnational 
governments in 2008, followed by Latin America. Even Africa has seen its ratings of subnational 
governments increased from zero in 1998 to 10 in 2008 (Moody’s 2008a)5.   
The increased coverage of subnational credit ratings by rating agencies, to some extent, may also 
be seen as a natural outcome of the increased coverage of sovereign ratings.6  The former tends 
to follow in the footsteps of the latter.  In the late 1980s and early 1990s, rating agencies stepped 
up their activities in the emerging economies, with Latin America being the primary target.  By 
1990, S&P and Moody’s had rated 35 and 33 sovereigns respectively; among them were 
Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela.  In the early 1990s, rating agencies began to make their forays 
into sub-sovereign ratings in the emerging economies.   
                                                 
2 The term subnational refers to those public entities in the tiers of government lower than the federal or central 
government. Subnational entities include states/provinces, counties, cities, towns, public utility companies, school 
districts and other special purpose governments which have the capacity to incur debt.    
3 For example, the city of Warsaw and its infrastructure municipal companies plan to issue bonds in 2009 (Warsaw 
City Debt Strategy, 2009), including in foreign markets. China plans to issue $200 billion yuan sub-sovereign bonds 
in 2009, as part of the fiscal stimulus package to finance infrastructure (the Ministry of Finance news conference on 
March 17, 2009).  
4  As of March, 2008, Moody’s rated 306 regional and local governments in 35 countries outside the United States.  
S&P rates subnational governments in more than 30 countries outside the United States.  See Moody’s (2008a), S&P 
(2009), Gallard (2006).  
5 Much of the growth came with the acquisition of domestic rating agencies and the subsequent assumption – with 
some modifications – of the predecessor agency’s portfolio of ratings.  Moody’s for example acquired agencies in 
the Czech Republic and in South Africa.  
6 The history of sovereign ratings itself dates back to the early 1900s.  Moody’s issued its first sovereign rating well 
before World War I.  But modern sovereign ratings began to grow steadily only in the 1980s.   
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Since the early 2000s, subnational credit ratings in emerging economies have surged. During the 
same period, many emerging economies such as Colombia, India, Mexico, Peru, Russia, and 
South Africa have moved toward establishing a regulatory framework for subnational borrowing 
and debt management (Liu and Waibel, 2008a).  The new borrowing framework aims at 
addressing problems that had led to subnational debt crisis or fiscal stress in these countries in 
the 1990s.  In some countries such as Mexico, subnational credit ratings have become an 
essential element of the new borrowing framework. In other countries such as Russia, the 
reemergence of the subnational bond market since 2001 explains the rise of subnational credit 
ratings.      
Mexico introduced a credit rating system for subnational governments as part of its new 
subnational borrowing framework. Although subnational participation in the credit ratings is 
voluntary, the requirements of the capital-risk weighting of bank loans introduced in 2000 and of 
loss provisions introduced in 2004 aim at imposing subnational fiscal discipline through the 
market pricing of subnational credit. China is piloting an experiment with S&P credit ratings of 
municipal infrastructure investment companies owned by Chongqing municipality (population 
31 million) to help establish a benchmark for market-based monitoring of municipal companies 
which have become the pillar of infrastructure-led growth in China. The significant increase in 
subnational credit ratings is largely driven by the increasing subnational borrowing from the 
capital market around the world.   
The increasing subnational borrowing is driven by large infrastructure investment needs in 
developing countries. A large share of infrastructure investments has been decentralized to the 
subnational level.  With 60 million people moving to cities per year, rapid urbanization will 
require large-scale public investment ranging from mass urban transit and electric power to water 
and sanitation.  Although the pace of rural-urban migration is slowing down during the current 
global economic downturn, the long-term structural trend of rural-urban migration continues.   
Subnational governments with fiscal strength in emerging economies are increasingly looking to 
capital markets to fund large infrastructure projects. 7 Borrowing enables local government to 
capture the benefits of major capital investments immediately, rather than having to wait until 
sufficient savings from current income can be accumulated to finance them.  Debt financing 
provides a better matching of maturity terms with the asset life of the infrastructure, so that the 
cost of financing is shared across the present and future generations of beneficiaries of the 
infrastructure being debt financed.    
The emergence of subnational credit ratings could have implications for public finance in 
developing countries.  It calls for fiscal transparency and greater disclosure of independently 
audited financial accounts.  Subnational credit markets are expected to deepen and broaden over 
time as an economy develops and matures.  Indeed, in most developed economies, the 
                                                 
7 Subnational governments can utilize a variety of financing instruments, including issuing bonds and borrowing 
from banks. Top-tier subnational governments with credit strength are going beyond traditional bank financing and 
issuing bonds in countries such as Colombia, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, and Turkey.  Smaller local governments 
tend to rely on bank lending and fiscal transfers. Banks as lenders usually carry out their own credit analyses. 
Subnational governments have also formed public private partnerships for infrastructure financing in countries such 
as Brazil, China, India and Russia.   
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subnational debt market constitutes a key component of the capital markets.8 It is important 
therefore for potential lenders and investors such as multilateral agencies, commercial banks and 
private sector participants in the international capital market to understand how the rating 
agencies conduct their subnational creditworthiness analysis. At the policy level, such 
understanding helps contribute to policymakers’ broader fiscal reform programs.  
This paper attempts to provide an understanding of the methodologies used by the three major 
international rating agencies (S&P, Moody’s and Fitch) in assessing the creditworthiness of 
subnational governments.9  All three rating agencies share the general approach of deriving the 
final score for rating from a matrix of quantitative and qualitative factors covering economic, 
fiscal, financial and institutional factors. Understanding how these variables are used and how 
they may differ among the agencies allows us to better appreciate what constitutes a sound 
subnational credit standing.  It also contributes to the development of a comparative database for 
fiscal monitoring.  This paper will also discuss other major issues and challenges related to 
subnational credit ratings, such as the importance of sovereign factor as a determinant of 
subnational credit ratings, changes in the methodologies as a result of risks from indirect debt 
and off-balance-sheet financing, and the required governance and institutional reforms for a 
robust rating system and fiscal monitoring.  
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we review and compare the rating process for 
subnational governments, the key variables considered when assigning a subnational rating, and 
the similarities and differences among the rating approaches used by the three major rating 
agencies. Section 3 analyzes the benefits and limitations of subnational credit ratings.  Section 4 
looks at the interaction between sovereign and sub-sovereign ratings and the binding impact of 
the sovereign rating on the ratings of sub-sovereign credits.  Section 5 discusses important 
changes in subnational rating methodology that took place in the last decade and the reinforced 
focus on debt profile and contingent liabilities following the financial crisis.  Section 6 discusses 
challenges of subnational credit ratings in developing countries.  Section 7 concludes the paper. 
2. The Rating Process and Criteria 
The credit rating of a subnational government represents a formal opinion of the subnational 
government’s capacity and willingness to repay commercial debt obligations in full and on time.  
Each rating agency follows a certain procedure in deriving the final rating for the subnational 
government being rated.10   The key forum for decision making is the rating committee, which is 
made up of a group of experienced analysts who are familiar with the creditworthiness 
conditions in the rated entity.  The rating is decided by votes after the deliberation of the 
committee. 
 
At the core of the rating analysis is a matrix of political, economic, budgetary, financial and 
institutional variables deemed relevant to the subnational government’s creditworthiness. All 
                                                 
8 For example, in the United State, sub-sovereign bond accounts for 26 percent of public sector debt and 10 percent 
of total public and corporate debt (Liu and Waibel 2008a).  
9 The World Bank (1999) provided some information on, but not a comparative review of, the subnational credit 
ratings. Since 1999, rating methodologies have gone through significant changes.  
10  See Bhatia (2002), Hilderman (1999), S&P (2009), Moody’s (2008a), Fitch (2008b). 
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rating agencies analyze a range of qualitative and quantitative variables to derive a final rating 
score. For example, Moody’s has used the following methodology since 2006: Each variable is 
given a numerical score.  A weighted average of all the individual scores is then used to derive 
the final score.  Each final score corresponds to a specific letter-based rating.  The higher the 
letter grade, the smaller the probability of default.  Typically, the ratings are categorized into 
“investment-grade” and “speculative” ratings.  Table 1 in Annex lists the comparable ratings for 
the three agencies. 
2.1 What Factors Determine a Rating?  
A limited set of variables lies at the heart of the subnational credit rating process.  Although 
specific emphases may vary among the three rating agencies, the substantive criteria they use do 
not differ very much.  Broadly speaking, the variables or factors that go into the ratings analysis 
may be divided into the following five categories: (i) the subnational economic conditions; (ii) 
the fiscal performance of the subnational government; (iii) the financial and debt position of the 
subnational government; (iv) the management quality and institutional strengths of subnational 
institutions; and (v) the influence of sovereign factors, intergovernmental relationships and fiscal 
arrangements.  In what follows, we look into the details of these five categories of factors that all 
three agencies consider.11 
2.1.1  Subnational Economy 
The key question here is to what extent is the subnational government’s fiscal position (and 
hence creditworthiness) affected by conditions in the local economy. Subnational governments 
receive their income from two sources: (i) “transfers” and “grants” from the national, or other 
higher levels of, government; and (ii) “own-source revenue” collected from the local economy.  
The former are usually fixed by some intergovernmental fiscal arrangements (formula-based or 
otherwise) and thus may not be too sensitive to the performance of the local economy.12  The 
latter – which typically comprises items like sales and property taxes, stamp duties, business-
related fees and charges and in some cases, certain income taxes as well – is likely to be affected 
by local economic conditions.  
 
Similarly there are two types of expenditures that the subnational government has to provide for: 
obligatory and discretionary.  The obligatory spending is typically covered by transfers from the 
national government and thus will not be too sensitive to the local economic conditions.  
However, whether the spending is obligatory or discretionary, it will be more vulnerable to the 
business cycles in the local economy if it is of a safety-net type (e.g., unemployment benefits). 
In general, rating agencies view fiscal solvency as being linked to economic strength. This 
subnational economy component of the rating analysis covers at least three aspects of the local 
economy.   
 
(1) The growth prospects of the subnational economy.  This is used as a proxy of the subnational 
government’s future revenue base.  Generally this may be captured in some trend analysis of 
                                                 
11 See S&P (2009), Moody (2008a) and Fitch (2008b).  Some of the differences among the three rating agencies are 
highlighted in Section 2.3.  
12 This assumes that the subnational economy is not dominant in the national economy. 
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macro-variables such as local production/income growth (or gross regional domestic product), 
inflation, employment, and retail sales.  To gauge the growth potential of the subnational 
economy, critical factors include natural endowments, strategic location or assets that the 
subnational economy enjoys, educational and skill levels of the workforce, quality of the 
business infrastructure, level of entrepreneurial and innovation activities and competence of the 
local leaders.  Just as important is the subnational government’s demonstrated ability to initiate 
policies to enhance its economic competitiveness such as industrial restructuring to move into 
high value added sectors, and promotion of innovation and creativity. 
   
(2) The structure of the subnational economy.  This will indicate how stable the local income 
growth is.  A diversified production structure is important in ensuring such stability.  If 
subnational regions are “assigned” a certain production function by the national government, 
based on its perceived comparative advantage, this could add to the volatility of growth in the 
local economy especially if the production activities are pro-cyclical in nature.  Also affecting 
the stability of the growth base of the subnational economy are variables such as the severity of 
unemployment problem. 
 
(3) The demographic variable. This has a strong bearing on the demand for public services that 
the subnational government has to provide.  For example, the population size could affect the 
amount of transfers and grants from the central government, as they are often computed based on 
the number of residents in the local economy.  The growth rate, the density and the age 
distribution of the population, on the other hand, point to the subnational economy’s income 
generating capacity and demand for public services in the future.  For instance, a rapidly aging 
population may point to declining income generation power and rising demands for social 
services while high population growth due to the influx of young immigrant workers could have 
a very positive implication.  An important indicator here is the overall ratio of dependent to total 
population.  It captures in a nutshell the burden that population may impose on the subnational 
budget in future. 
2.1.2 Subnational Fiscal Performance 
This component of the rating analysis concerns the subnational government’s capacity to manage 
its fiscal position sustainably.  The assessment takes into account not only a government’s track 
record but also the flexibility it enjoys in adjusting its future revenues and expenditures, as well 
as its ability to manage potential fiscal imbalance.   The ability of the subnational government to 
adjust both revenue and expenditures to improve its fiscal strength will be a boost to its 
creditworthiness.  The rating agencies examine the fiscal position in the following three areas. 
 
(1) Revenue flexibility.  Increased revenue could come from either a higher income-base for 
revenue collection or a change in the revenue base itself.  The former depends largely on the 
local economic conditions (which the subnational government could try to influence) while the 
latter calls for strong fiscal management capacity within the taxation power granted to the 
subnational governments.  The proportion of revenue that is “modifiable” i.e., over which the 
subnational government has the power to change either by increasing the rates or expanding the 
base, gives an indication of its flexibility in improving fiscal position.  It is possible for instance 
for the subnational government to increase its revenue by being more efficient in the way it 
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manages the local economy. Subnational governments can also improve the tax system such as 
the property tax within its purview.   
 
In countries where fiscal transfers account for the majority share of subnational governments’ 
revenue stream (such as in Colombia, Mexico, and Turkey), the revenue flexibility is 
constrained. The transfer systems are established through a framework or formula for a fixed 
period of time, and the subnational government has to manage its fiscal flexibility within the 
existing intergovernmental arrangements.   
  
(2) Expenditure flexibility.  A subnational government’s expenditure flexibility depends firstly 
on the proportion of total spending that is considered “discretionary,” i.e., the non-essential 
capital and current expenditures.  Essential capital expenditure is generally taken as the 
minimum needed to maintain the existing infrastructure and to complete important and urgent 
new projects while essential operating spending typically includes personnel costs, interest 
payments and services mandated by the national (or higher level) government.  On the latter, the 
national government typically takes care of spending related to defense, security, justice, foreign 
affairs, national economic policy matters and other nation-wide functions, leaving the 
subnational government to pay for expenditures connected with the provision of local services.   
 
Within the discretionary spending, the subnational government’s flexibility in spending depends 
on its ability to manage expenses.  This in turn depends on its operational efficiency and the 
political will to do the unpopular.  Personnel costs typically account for the bulk of the 
subnational spending and a reduction in such spending has considerable political repercussions.  
The subnational government’s track record in expenditure cutting, especially during economic 
downturns when revenue declines, provides an indication of the flexibility it has in managing 
expenditures. 
 
(3) Capacity and flexibility in managing budget deficits.  Projection of revenue and expenditure 
trends does not represent the whole picture of the subnational government’s fiscal position and 
flexibility.  Just as important are the quality of its projection and its ability and flexibility in 
managing a fiscal imbalance when confronted with one.  Persistent deficits in operating balance 
in particular should be carefully scrutinized to see if there is any mismatch between recurring 
income and expenses and hence a need to adjust either or both of them.  Continued reliance on 
borrowing to make up for the operating budget shortfalls, instead of an ability to reverse the 
imbalance trend either through raising revenue or cutting expenditures, undermines the 
subnational government’s credibility in fiscal management. 
 
In many countries, both the national government and the subnational governments are subject to 
constraints over the size of the budget deficit they each can incur.  Often, there are also 
constraints on the overall consolidated budget deficit of all public sectors in the country, which 
include all national and subnational budgets.  Indeed, there are times when subnationals have to 
trim their budget deficits or raise their budget surpluses to help meet certain national targets.  
Such inter-governmental fiscal arrangements may hinder the subnational’s ability to carry out 
certain economic activities that are deemed beneficial to its own economy.  The subnational 
government’s ability to provide effective solutions to overcome these constraints will help 
improve its credit standing. 
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2.1.3 Financial and Debt Position of Subnational Government 
Fiscal surpluses or deficits are “flow” items that could change the subnational government’s 
annual financial position.  But the subnational government’s creditworthiness also depends on 
how it manages its existing balance sheet and improves its debt servicing and repayment 
capacity.  As in any commercial organization, various financial ratios are used to assess the 
soundness of a subnational government’s financial position.  A number of issues are considered 
important in this regard, as examined below.   
  
(1) Liquidity and debt management.  The analysis tracks how well the government’s internal 
liquidity and investment policies are matched by the seasonality of its revenue and expenditure.  
The analysis factors in any outstanding short-term or variable-rate debt with bullet maturities.  
Some measures of liquidity adequacy ratio (e.g., the ratio of debt service to recurring revenue or 
other measures of payment capacity) are usually used to project the subnational’s debt servicing 
capacity.  They are also used by the national governments to establish the borrowing ceilings for 
local governments.  
  
A liquidity concern is on the potential mismatch between cash inflows and outflows in 
relationship to operating expenses, debt service, seasonality of cash flow, and financing of 
capital expenditure programs. The level of reserves and cash balance that the government 
maintains is important.  Refinancing risk is another consideration with balloon or bullet 
maturities or a large portion of short-term debt. Also important are the credit and market risks 
that the subnational may be exposed to, including maturity structure risk, interest rate risk, and 
foreign currency risk.  The actual risks may be mitigated by a well-structured debt profile, 
although this is often difficult to achieve because of the lack of financial sophistication in many 
developing economies, especially at the subnational level. 
 
(2) Managing debt burden.  Typically, the rating agencies will use several measures of debt 
burden to assess the degree to which a subnational government’s financial flexibility is 
constrained by fixed debt-service costs and the revenue raising ability to meet these costs.  
Emphasis is often placed on the ratios of direct debt to discretionary operating revenue and on 
tax-supported public sector debt relative to subnational GDP and on a per capita basis. Debt 
service is only one of many potential fixed costs and limitations on financial flexibility and it is 
possible for some highly indebted subnational governments to enjoy high credit ratings.   
As Fitch (2008a) noted, common debt burden measures include: debt principal relative to local 
gross product; debt principal per capita; debt principal relative to estimated market value of 
taxable property (for debt issues relying heavily on property taxes to finance operations an debt 
service); debt service as a percentage of current revenue and annual operating expenses; and 
annual pension liabilities as a percentage of current operating expenses, debt to current balance, 
and direct risk (direct debt plus other Fitch classified debt) to current revenue.  Some of these 
measures may be less informative because of the problems of availability or quality of the 
financial information required. 
(3) Managing off-balance-sheet liabilities.  There is increasing recognition of off-balance-sheet 
liabilities as a source of fiscal risks at all levels of government.  Like the national government, 
subnational governments are often called upon to provide guarantee to public sector entities and 
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enterprises under their charge.  They also face various contingent liabilities such as pension 
liabilities. Liu and Waibel (2008a) classified types of hidden and contingent liabilities for 
subnational governments.  These liabilities are difficult to estimate and yet could deal a severe 
blow to the subnational’s fiscal and financial health when they are “recognized”.  Provisioning 
for off-balance-sheet liabilities is a complex but a necessary part of sound financial management.  
Prudent management requires the subnational government to monitor closely the credit quality of 
the public sector entities and enterprises for which it is expected to provide assistance or even 
bail out in times of failure.  Doing so helps to provide clarity to the likelihood and potential 
magnitude of any potential governmental intervention.   
 
Rating agencies examine off-balance-sheet liabilities involving debt-like instruments or 
commitments such as leases, majority ownership of enterprises even without explicit guarantees, 
public-private partnerships and securitizations for which the subnational government is or may 
become responsible. These may represent efforts by the subnational governments to circumvent 
debt limits imposed on them.  
 
(4) Credibility in debt management.  Just like credibility in fiscal management, the subnational 
government’s credibility in financial management is an important consideration in credit ratings.  
It is crucial that the subnational government consistently maintain a low arrears ratio and a zero 
default record.  Having the capacity to repay is not the same as having the willingness to repay.  
In some cases, subnational governments have refused to pay back the loans they took from the 
central government despite their having the necessary resources.13  While such defaults may only 
be a matter of financial transfer between the two levels of government, they nevertheless tarnish 
the subnational government’s creditworthiness records, making it difficult for them to access the 
capital market in future.     
2.1.4 Strengths of Institutions and Quality of Management 
The reliability of the fiscal and financial performance measures depends crucially on the quality 
of the reporting system.  Maintaining a credible reporting and monitoring system is a big 
challenge faced by subnational governments in many developing economies.  A sound financial 
reporting system should address issues such as the rigor of the budgeting and financial reporting 
process (e.g., sound and separate treatments for different expenditure items in the budget such as 
recurring and capital expenditures); the timeliness and comprehensiveness of the reports; the 
appropriateness of the accounting system (e.g., accrual- or cash-base accounting); and the quality 
of internal and external auditing.  The rating agencies do not audit the financial reports in the 
rating process.  They rely on the subnational government to provide reliable reports, preferably 
certified by independent public accountants, in accordance with the country’s generally accepted 
accounting standards, if not the standards of international best practice. 
 
More broadly, the subnational government should demonstrate an ability to address the issue of 
governance standards and maintain a certain quality in the entire financial system.  For example, 
is there sufficient transparency and accountability in the budgeting process?  Are there clear rules 
about the treatment of subnational debt vis-à-vis debts issued by other levels of government?  
                                                 
13 This was the case in Indonesia for example (Tan 2005). 
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Are the creditors able to enforce the covenants in the case of disputes?  Is there a rigorous risk 
management system in place?  
 
The existence of institutionalized rules and legal requirements governing subnational debt 
issuance is considered a strength for subnational creditworthiness.  However such 
institutionalization may not be widely practiced among the developing economies.  In their 
absence, policy guidelines and the management’s compliance with them will be evaluated.  The 
credibility of the sub-government is a key issue here.  Its attitude towards maintaining a sound 
fiscal position, the budgetary control matters and its ability to limit budget variances are among 
important considerations in the rating process.  
2.1.5   Sovereign Factors 
Sovereign factors strongly influence the credit ratings of subnational governments, as will be 
detailed in Section 4, and all rating agencies analyze subnational credit within the sovereign 
framework. As argued by Ianchovichina, Liu and Nagarajan (2007), subnational fiscal 
sustainability is complicated by the respective legislative mandates of central vis-à-vis 
subnational governments and the intergovernmental finance system. Unable to issue their own 
currency, subnationals cannot use seigniorage finance. Subnationals cannot freely adjust their 
primary balance due to legal constraints on own revenue and, in many countries, their 
dependence on central government transfers. The central government can also influence key 
expenditure items such as wages and pensions. Many policies that affect the economic growth 
and the fiscal health of the subnational economy are designed to varying degree by the central 
government.  
 
They also note that subnational borrowing behavior is influenced by the intergovernmental fiscal 
system and the structure of financial markets.  Paradoxally, a high rating of a subnational 
government’s credit can be consistent with unsustainable subnational fiscal policies. Market 
participants may tolerate unsustainable fiscal policy of a subnational government if past history 
backs their perception that the central government implicitly guarantees the debt service of the 
subnational government.  The soft budget constraint, a key aspect of fiscal incentives, allows 
subnational governments to live beyond their means, negating competitive incentives and 
fostering corruption and rent seeking. 
2.2  Examples of Rating Changes 
The range of credit ratings that subnational governments receive reflects differences in their 
performance and circumstances, as measured by the variables considered by the rating agencies. 
A change in rating for the same subnational government reflects improvement or deterioration of 
the government‘s performance or circumstances.      
Take the example of subnational governments in France. S&P has rated 17 French local and 
regional governments.  Since February 2006, two ratings were lowered. One of the downgrades 
concerned Polynesia. Polynesia has undergone several downgrades, from A-/Positive in August 
2004, to A-/Watch negative in May 2005 and BBB+/Negative in January 2008.  The investment 
grade rating in 2008 reflects strong financial support from the national government, strong 
revenue autonomy, satisfactory financial performance, and moderate debt by international 
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standards. However, the downgrading is influenced by the persistence of an uncertain political 
situation and subsequent absence of visibility on the country's finances; Polynesia's structurally 
dependent and vulnerable economy; growing rigidities on operating costs; and significant off- 
balance-sheet risks. 
Another French subnational government provides a good example of how local governments’ 
sound fiscal management can improve ratings. City of Avignon’s tight grip on spending, 
consistently strong operating performance, and further debt reduction resulted in consistent 
rating upgrades and stable outlook: from BBB/Positive in February 2005, to BBB+/Positive in 
May 2005 and to A-/Stable in January 2008.  
As noted by S&P, Spain provides another interesting example of how, within a single 
institutional framework and economic context, the varying levels of fiscal flexibility among 
different types of regional government contribute to ratings differentiation. Spain's special status 
regions such as Navarre and Basque Country are both rated 'AAA', which is above the 'AA' 
average for Spain's normal-status regions. This is in part because the special status regions 
benefit from a specific and highly beneficial financing system, which provides them with 
significant revenue flexibility in terms of tax regulation, collection, and tax management. Spain's 
special status regions also have relatively greater protection against unilateral decisions from the 
central government involving unfunded expenditure responsibilities.   
The ongoing global financial crisis is affecting the credit strength of subnational governments. 
Fitch for example undertook negative rating actions for some European subnational governments 
in December 2008, although to a more moderate extent than the other sectors. However, 
downgrading pressure is expected to increase in 2009 (Fitch, 2008b). The economic downturn is 
slowing growth in fiscal revenues, and higher capital expenditure is expected as the central and 
subnational governments plan to increase infrastructure spending as part of fiscal stimulus. 
Access to capital market has become more difficult, which may lead to liquidity problems.  Part 
of the downgrading pressure for subnational credit quality is expected to come from declines in 
sovereign credit strengths.  
2.3  Comparing the Rating Criteria of Major Rating Agencies 
The approaches to subnational ratings among the three major rating agencies are strikingly 
similar.  Not only do they adopt a similar rating process, they also share similar rating criteria.  
What could differentiate one rating agency from another is the relative weight they assign to 
each rating variable, the importance they attach to the qualitative variables, and how the relative 
weights of these variables change over time.   
 
There have been few published studies offering direct comparison of the rating processes and 
methodologies used by the three agencies, especially for subnational ratings.  Most studies have 
instead focused on comparing the rating outcomes of the agencies.  To some extent, having 
comparable rating outcomes may be taken as indirect evidence of the comparability of the rating 
approaches and criteria used (to derive the outcomes). Gaillard (2006) shows that the subnational 
ratings of Moody’s and S&P are very similar in most cases.  One could argue that since the 
rating outcomes among the rating agencies are so close, the underlying rating methodologies and 
criteria could not have differed very widely. 
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2.3.1 Rating Criteria  
The broad rating criteria of these agencies are essentially set up to capture the information of the 
subnational entity in the following areas: local economic conditions; fiscal position; financial and 
debt position; the strength of the institutions and the quality of the management; and the 
influence of the sovereign factors and intergovernmental fiscal arrangements.  These criteria are 
publicly available and known to all rating agencies.  Thus, while each rating agency may have 
some preferences on what specific variables to use within each of the five main categories (e.g., 
they may differ on the exact debt service ratios to adopt and the denominators to be used in such 
debt service ratios), they do not differ on the major important rating variables.  Over the last 
decade, there appears to be an even greater tendency for the methodologies to converge among 
the three agencies as they now pay more attention to common issues such as the quality of 
management, the strength of institutions, corporate governance and liquidity and risk 
management.  The current financial crisis has further consolidated the emphasis on debt and 
liquidity management.   
 
The differences that an outside observer may detect among the three rating agencies are likely to 
be of a formatting rather than fundamental nature.  The three agencies may place a certain 
variable under different categories, reflecting the different philosophical approaches they adopt 
in treating the variable.  Take the example of financial and debt positions. All three rating 
agencies consider the following issues important under this category: management of liquidity 
and debt positions, management of debt burden, and management of off-balance-sheet liabilities.  
All agree that indirect debt (mainly off-balance-sheet and contingent liabilities) need to be 
treated separately from direct debt and that details of the indirect debts deserve to be carefully 
scrutinized.  All rating agencies are also paying greater attention to the subnational government’s 
exposure to short-term debt and variable interest rate and currency risks.  The ongoing global 
financial crisis has further consolidated the rating agencies’ emphasis on explicit and implicit 
liabilities and liquidity management.  
 
While Fitch (2008a) treats liquidity and debt profile including off-budget liabilities in a 
combined category, Moody’s treats liquidity with financial position and deals with debt profile 
including off-budget liabilities in a separate category. While a subnational government’s 
liquidity position is part of the fiscal position analysis in Moody’s framework, S&P puts it with 
debt management. S&P (2009) lists liquidity and debt management, debt burden, and off-balance 
budget liabilities in three separate categories. In addition to the usual array of financial and debt 
ratios, Fitch pays attention to indirect risk of public-sector entities even though the debt of these 
entities is not guaranteed by a subnational government.  S&P pays special attention to the use of 
derivative instruments and potential risks.   
To take another example, all rating agencies understand the great importance of the influence of 
sovereign (political as well as economic) factors and the impact of intergovernmental fiscal 
relationships.  Fitch combines the two issues under “institutional and administrative factors” and 
considers it critical to decide how the sub-sovereign rating relates to sovereign ratings. In 
Moody’s the issues are evaluated under two categories, “operating environment” referring to the 
national economic and political context in which subnational governments function, and 
“institutional framework” which “determines intergovernmental relations and shape of RLGs 
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powers and responsibilities” (Moody’s 2008a). In the S&P model, the sovereign factor is treated 
in the category of “system support and predictability”, which focuses on the intergovernmental 
fiscal system and the legal framework for subnational debt, and in the category of “financial 
flexibility”, which discusses political influence, and the degree of flexibility a subnational 
government has in managing its fiscal affairs within the parameters set by the intergovernmental 
system.   
2.3.2 Rating Process 
The three rating agencies follow a similar rating procedure.  The key forum of the process is the 
Rating Committee.  Upon request for a subnational rating, an agency typically will assign 
various analysts to review the performance of the subnational government in different areas in 
accordance with its rating criteria.  A lead analyst is also appointed.  The analysis will cover not 
only all the statistics and other quantitative information that the rated entity provides, it will also 
include an assessment of the qualitative elements such as the strength of the institutions, the 
quality of the management system, the credibility of the policies, the stability of the political and 
economic environments, etc.  A good understanding of the qualitative aspects of the rating 
process is vital as it provides insights into the subnational government’s credit quality that 
published information may not offer.  This is especially so in developing countries where the 
accuracy and quality of the quantitative data are often questionable.  In some cases, the 
quantitative data are not even available. 
 
After the analysts have analyzed and reviewed the relevant information, the rating committee 
will then convene to deliberate on the analysis. Benchmarking with similar subnational 
governments that the agency has rated will be undertaken before a rating is assigned.  This 
outcome is then conveyed to the rated subnational government and feedback and comments from 
the latter will be taken.  The rating agency may amend its rating decision if substantial and 
material new information is presented by the subnational government.  The final rating decision 
is then made and the result disseminated to the public.14 
 
Recently, Moody’s has tried to introduce a more quantitative, model-driven approach to 
subnational ratings, in order to provide a more systematic basis to rate factors which are difficult 
to model because they are qualitative in nature (Moody’s 2008a). The Baseline Credit 
Assessment (BCA) analyzes a subnational government’s intrinsic strength and the default 
analysis examines the likelihood of extraordinary support from another entity to prevent a 
default. Both analyses become a part of Joint Default Analysis. The BCA scorecard uses a set of 
quantitative and qualitative credit metrics and statistically gauges stand-alone strength.  As rating 
agencies seek to improve on the consistency of their creditworthiness evaluation, it is inevitable 
that they would try to provide a quantified measure of more qualitative factors over time.  
3. Benefits and Limitations of Subnational Credit Ratings 
While more national governments in developing countries view subnational credit ratings as an 
essential element of broad reform to promote capital market development and enhance fiscal 
                                                 
14  See S&P (2004, 2007b), Fitch (2002) and Moody’s (1998). 
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transparency, there are two direct benefits for subnational governments to utilize independent 
credit ratings – a good track record of creditworthiness allows subnational governments to raise 
funds in the capital market and to reduce the cost of capital.  However, there are also limitations 
on the effective interpretation and use of credit ratings. Below we summarize both the benefits 
and the limitations.  
3.1  Accessing Capital Markets 
The main reason for subnational governments wanting to seek a formal rating is the ability to 
raise funds directly in capital markets.  If the experience of sovereign ratings is anything to go 
by, the ability to establish a good track record in creditworthiness could indeed affect the pattern 
of capital flows to and the dynamics of economic growth in developing countries.  In many 
emerging East Asian countries, for example, the fast pace of economic development before the 
1997 financial crisis was in no small measure attributed to the vast inflows of foreign capital 
inflows.  The credit ratings that many of these economies obtained, with a number of them being 
rated investment-grade and above (e.g., Malaysia, South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia), were a 
key contributor to such capital flows.  
 
Securing a formal investment-grade rating could help attract capital inflows and substantially 
lower borrowing costs as the ratings have a major impact on yield spreads.  Having a sound 
rating expands the range of institutional investors available to the subnational borrower. With the 
financial crisis, investors are likely to prefer to invest in instruments with substantially lower 
risks.  
 
While credit ratings are required to access the international capital market, the reasons for getting 
a credit rating vary based on the rules of each domestic market.  In Colombia, ratings are 
necessary for regulatory purposes. In Argentina, ratings are voluntary and are used as a 
disclosure gesture to inform investors.15  In Mexico, although subnational participation in the 
credit ratings is voluntary, the requirements of the capital-risk weighting of bank loans 
introduced in 2000 and of loss provisions introduced in 2004 aim at imposing subnational fiscal 
discipline through the market.  China is piloting S&P’s credit ratings of municipal investment 
companies owned by Chongqing municipality (population 31 million), to establish a benchmark 
for market-based monitoring of municipal companies. 
  
Major investment banks in the world makes regular assessment of a country’s sovereign risks but 
it does not translate such risk assessment into a rating that can be used for cross-country 
comparison.  Neither does it provide similar risk assessments for subnational governments. 
Moreover, to meet market demands, most of them focus on short-term analysis, with relatively 
little attention being given to medium- and long-term risk assessment.  A major problem with 
these risk assessments is their perceived bias, i.e., they are not seen to be independent of the 
commercial interests of the banks. 
   
The outcome of the rating agencies’ assessment of a country’s sovereign risks, on the other hand, 
is translated to a specific rating which allows investors to make comparisons across countries and 
over time.  Such comparisons are essential in pricing the debt.  The ratings are updated regularly 
                                                 
15 World Bank (1999), chapter 6.  
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to incorporate the changing risk situations, allowing investors to revise their investment plans.  
Obviously the usefulness of these ratings depends on the comprehensiveness of the analysis and 
the timeliness of the updates.  As discussed later in the paper, factors contributing to the failure 
of ratings are broadly the same whether it is sovereign or sub-sovereign.  
3.2  Credit Ratings and Spread 
Good credit ratings can translate into lower borrowing cost as reflected in the lower spread of the 
debt instrument.  Various studies have shown the negative relationship between credit ratings 
and spreads by using benchmark sovereign bonds (say 10 years) of various countries (both 
developed and emerging) against credit ratings.  
 
Sy (2002) uses panel data estimation (1994-2001) of secondary market sovereign bond spreads 
and ratings in seventeen emerging market economies using EMBI+16for calculated spreads and 
S&P and Moody’s announced country credit ratings. The study finds a negative correlation 
between the sovereign spreads and assigned ratings, i.e., higher ratings are associated with lower 
spreads and vice versa.  It also finds that dispersion of spreads increased during the financial 
crises of 1998, demonstrating that there is increased discrimination among the countries during a 
crisis and that spreads are not fully based on the assigned countries ratings. The findings suggest 
that the market participants rely on additional explanatory variables (e.g., trading strategies, 
volume or bid ask spreads and other market factors) in addition to ratings.17  Using unbalanced 
panel data, the same study finds that a one-notch upgrade by rating agencies reduces sovereign 
spreads on average by 14 percent (or 70 basis points for an initial spread of 500 basis points).  
The findings are confirmed by Rowland (2005).  
 
Reisen and Maltzan (1999) examine the links between sovereign credit ratings and dollar bond 
yield spreads over the period from 1989 to 1997. This study follows the market trends for 30 
days before and after rating announcements and uses the Granger causality test (which corrects 
for joint determinants of ratings and yield spreads). They conclude that changes in sovereign 
ratings are mutually interdependent with changes in bond yields and that the risk assessment by 
the three leading rating agencies is preceded by a similar change in the market assessment of 
sovereign risk.  
 
                                                 
16 EMBI+ (Emerging Market Bond Index Plus) is J.P. Morgan calculated sovereign bond spreads. These indices 
show countries weighted averages of all traded external currency denominated debt instruments in the emerging 
markets. Rather than traditional spreads over the US Treasuries, they control for floating coupons, principal 
collaterals, and rolling interest guarantees etc.  
17 In the Article in the Journal of Banking and Finance “An Introduction to Recent Research on Credit Ratings” 
2004, it has been also mentioned that “One of the earliest branches of the literature explores the relationship between 
credit ratings and bond prices or spreads. That literature has generally found that ratings are strongly correlated with 
credit spreads, but many other factors are also important.” 
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Cantor and Packer (1996) find that the market – as gauged by sovereign debt yields – broadly 
shares the relative ranking of sovereign credit risks made by the two rating agencies (S&P and 
Moody’s). Their study includes cases when rating announcements led to a change in existing 
spreads.  However on average those changes are not that significant because many rating 
changes are anticipated by the market. Their analyses show that sovereign ratings effectively 
summarize and supplement the information contained in macro indicators and are therefore 
strongly correlated with market–determined credit spreads. Most of the correlation appears to 
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reflect similar interpretation of publicly available information by the rating agencies and by 
market participants. 
3.3 Sub-sovereign Defaults 
Compared with corporate bonds, subnational defaults are less frequent in the United States 
(Moody’s 2002).  Outside the United States, the overall size of the sub-sovereign sample is quite 
small, and sub-sovereign defaults have tended to be clustered around sovereign crisis (Moody’s 
2008b).  Based on a sample covering 1983-2007, Moody’s study (2008b) indicates that non-U.S. 
sub-sovereign ratings have been concentrated in the investment grade category. Rating changes 
for investment-grade sub-sovereign issuers have been on average less frequent than for corporate 
issuers and somewhat more frequent than for sovereign issuers.  In contrast, Ba and B sub-
sovereign ratings have been less stable than both speculative-grade sovereign and corporate 
ratings.  However, due to the small size of the sample, conclusive evidence is absent.  
According to Moody’s research (2008c), historically sovereign ratings have been more stable at 
higher rating levels and modestly more stable than their corporate counterparts. Sovereign 
default rates have been generally been lower than corporate default rates. However, the 
differences are not likely significant as the overall size of the sovereign sample is small.  As 
Bhatia (2002) notes, “Sovereign default probabilities will remain statistically not meaningful 
until more default experience has accumulated” (p. 37).  
Nonetheless, Annex Table 2, which provides Moody’s average cumulative default rates for 
corporate long-term debt instruments based on empirical evidence spanning over 85 years, 
illustrates what the different categories of ratings mean in practice.  As we can see, at the time of 
issuance, the probabilities of default for speculative-grade ratings are a lot higher than those for 
investment-grade ratings.  For example, according to Moody’s, an Aaa rating carries with it, on 
average, only a 0.16 percent probability of default 5 years after issuance.  In contrast, a B rating 
implies a 21.4 percent probability of default for the same duration of time.   
3.4  Rating Failures 
There are limited data detailing failures of sub-sovereign ratings. But factors contributing to the 
failure are broadly the same whether it is sovereign or sub-sovereign. The failures of all major 
rating agencies in anticipating the East Asia crisis are particularly illustrating.   
 
Bhatia (2002) defines rating agencies’ failure to predict a sovereign’s rating accordingly if they 
downgrade or upgrade long term foreign currency ratings by three or more notches in aggregate 
during any rolling 12-month period. In the case of Thailand, S&P downgraded the sovereign’s 
foreign currency long term rating by four notches within the four month period. This, according 
to Bhatia, signals inability of the credit rating agency to assign correctly a credit rating in the 
times of financial crises.  The two tables below compare ratings before and during the crisis for 
sovereign foreign currency debt and local currency debt.  
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Overall, sovereign ratings are reliable predictors of sovereign default risk.18  However, various 
authors conclude that the credit rating agencies were not able to predict and to warn the market 
participants of imminent default risks with the onset of financial turbulence and crisis.19 During 
the Asian financial crises, Korea’s rating, for example, fell on average four letter grades and ten 
rating notches within a three-month period; sovereign rating changes of that magnitude had 
never been seen before. Reinhart (2002) concludes that sovereign credit ratings systematically 
fail to predict currency crises but do considerably better in predicting defaults. Downgrades in 
credit ratings usually follow currency crises, possibly suggesting that currency instability 
increases the risk of default. He also finds that in emerging market economies there is a strong 
link between currency crises and default.  
 
Sovereign Foreign Currency Selective Defaults 
 
Country Selective 
Default 
Date 
Rating one 
year before 
SD  
Downgrade 
in Notches 
Time in SD Date of 
Emergence 
Rating at 
Emergence 
Russia 01/27/99 BB- (-8) 10 months 12/08/00 B- 
Pakistan 01/29/99 B+ (-6) 10 months 12/21/99 B- 
Indonesia 03/30/99 B- (-5) 1 day 03/31/99 CCC+ 
Indonesia 04/17/00 CCC+ (-4) 4.5 months 10/02/00 B- 
Indonesia 04/23/02 B- (-5) 3.5 months 09/05/02 CCC+ 
Argentina 11/06/01 BB (-9) 42 months 06/01/05 B- 
Paraguay 02/13/03 B (-6) 15.5 months 07/26/04 B- 
Uruguay 05/16/03 BB- (-8) 0.5 months 06/02/03 B- 
Grenada 12/30/04 BB- (-8) 11.5 months 11/18/05 B- 
Venezuela 01/18/05 B- (-5) 1.5 months 03/03/05 B 
Dominican 
Rep. 
02/01/05 CCC  5 months 06/29/05 B 
Belize 12/07/06 CCC-   SD  
Data Source: S&P (2007b) 
 
Sovereign Local Currency Selective Defaults 
 
Country Selective 
Default 
Date 
Rating one 
year before 
SD  
Downgrade 
in Notches 
Time in SD Date of 
Emergence 
Rating at 
Emergence 
Argentina 11/06/01 BBB- (-11) 42 months 06/01/05 B- 
Dominican 
Rep. 
04/09/99 BB (-9) 26 months  06/12/01 B- 
Grenada 01/01/05 BB- (-8) 10.5 months 11/18/05 B- 
Cameroon 09/01/04 B (-6) 3 months 12/03/04 B- 
Data Source: S&P (2007b) 
                                                 
18 According to S&P (2007a), over the last thirty years (1975-2006), on average 16.3% of ‘BBB’ rated sovereigns 
lost their position by two or more categories. And in the category ‘B’, approximately 1/3 of the rated sovereigns 
received downgrading to selected default. All of the S&P’s default studies have found a clear correlation between 
credit quality and default remoteness: the higher the rating the lower the historic average of default, and vice versa.  
19 For example, see Reisen and Maltzan (1999) and Reihard (2002).  
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3.5  Problems Relating to the Rating Process  
Castillo (2004) and others noted some of the shortfalls associated with using the services 
provided by rating agencies, with shortfalls becoming obvious in the wake of the 1997/98 Asia 
financial crisis.20  First, the rating agencies are supposed to provide a signal to the market about 
the changing risk situations in their rated countries/companies.  Yet they often follow rather than 
lead the market in risk assessment.  The result is that the volatility of international capital flows 
is compounded and the economic instability exacerbated in many emerging economies.  That is, 
as a country encounters economic, fiscal or financial difficulties, the market begins to sell off 
their debt instruments.  The rating agencies follow by lowering the country’s rating which causes 
further souring of investor sentiments and capital outflows, aggravating the woes in the 
economy.     
 
Second, the oligopolistic nature of the rating market is seen by many to have lulled them into a 
state of complacency.  It accounts for their slowness in responding to rapidly changing risk 
situation for the entities they rate.  Often, the three major rating agencies appear to look at each 
other’s actions before they adjust their own ratings.  They are often reluctant to deviate from the 
“average” rating of the highly oligopolistic and protective industry.  The failure to detect the 
deteriorating credit conditions in Enron and in financial institutions more recently is cited as an 
example of the disastrous consequences of such un-competitive behaviors.21   
 
Third, there may be conflicts between providing independent risk assessment and the need to 
make commercial profits.  Rating agencies are profit-making companies.  They derive a large 
part of the income from rating fees paid by debt issuers.  The need to maintain a good 
commercial relationship with the issuers points to a strong incentive to be lenient in their rating 
exercises.  As Bhatia (2002) pointed out, the expansion of the agencies’ business into 
consultancy and advisory work exacerbates such a problem.  Faced with profit-making pressures, 
rating agencies often have to streamline their operations and reduce man power costs, resulting 
in inadequate resources for rigorous risk analysis.  As Castillo (2004) noted, many analysts free-
ride on the research provided by the IMF, the investment banks and even other rating agencies.  
Such convergence of views makes it difficult for rating agencies to detect risks that are not 
widely known.   
 
These shortfalls of rating agencies at the sovereign level are as much if not more relevant at the 
subnational level.  That these problems are not yet widely discussed at the subnational level may 
be attributed to the more recent history of sub-sovereign ratings in developing countries.  
However, as subnational ratings pick up momentum, one may see more rating failures at the 
subnational level similar to those encountered at the sovereign level.  Different proposals have 
been made to improve the efficiency and the credibility of the rating agencies, both through 
legislative and market-based policy changes.  Rating agencies themselves have also responded to 
some of these criticisms by making changes to their rating methodologies and processes.22  The 
ongoing financial crisis is also expected to lead to changes in the rating system for financial 
                                                 
20 Examples of shortfall of corporate ratings include the ratings of Enron and the failure of the rating agencies in 
assessing risks of financial institutions associated with the current financial crisis.   
21 See Castillo (2004), p. 10.   
22   See Bhatia (2002) and Castillo (2004).    
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institutions and financial instruments such as mortgage-backed securities. Criticism of the rating 
agency role in the current financial crisis relates mainly to structured finance ratings and banks, 
and not to subnational government ratings. 
4.  Sovereign Factors as a Determinant of Subnational Credit Ratings 
 
Sovereign factors play a major role in determining subnational ratings.  Not only do a country’s 
macroeconomic management and country-wide risks affect the broader economic, fiscal and 
financial conditions under which a subnational entity operates, a country’s overall credit rating 
could also place various restrictions on the subnational government’s ability to raise funds and to 
change its credit standing.  At the same time, favorable sovereign factors could be a significant 
boost for subnational ratings.   
In a recent study, Gaillard (2006) found that only three factors have a significant influence over 
subnational credit ratings conducted by the major international rating agencies: sovereign default 
history, national GDP per capita and the ratio of net direct and guaranteed debt to operating 
revenue.  Of the three, the subnational government could exert some control over the third 
variable.  The other two are sovereign variables over which the subnational government, if the 
size of the subnational economy is non-dominant, could not exercise much influence.  While 
questions have been raised about the robustness of Gaillard’s results,23 the findings nevertheless 
highlight the dominant role that sovereign factors play in subnational ratings.   
4.1 Sovereign Rating as Ceiling for Subnational Ratings 
Until 2001, the major rating agencies would not rate a subnational government above the 
sovereign rating.24  In effect, the sovereign rating acted as “ceiling” for all subnational ratings 
(and for that matter, all corporate ratings within the same domicile as well).  The reason for this 
was simple.  The national government typically has a wide range of constitutional powers giving 
it the first claims over the country’s foreign reserves and other resources.  It also has the power 
to print national currency which the subnational governments do not (except when the country 
belongs to a currency union such as the European Union where the common currency is printed 
by a supra-national body).   
 
Thus, in a financial crisis, the national government would likely be able to fulfill its external or 
domestic debt obligations ahead of the subnational government.  Given that a major part of the 
national government’s power over the subnational governments relates to its first claims on the 
country’s foreign currency reserves, it is not surprising that the rating “ceiling” relationship 
applies less strongly to domestic currency debt instruments.  Even in cases where the subnational 
government possesses foreign currency reserves that are out of reach of the national government, 
the latter could nevertheless impose nationwide capital or exchange controls to restrict capital 
                                                 
23  See Waibel (2006).  
24 There had been instances, before 2001, where subnational governments were rated more highly than the sovereign 
in terms of the domestic-currency debts they issued.  In Moody’s 1998 domestic currency ratings, for example, a 
number of Canadian municipalities enjoyed higher ratings than the Government of Canada.  Similarly, in that year, 
the city of Bologna was rated at Aa2 whereas Italy as a whole enjoyed only an Aa3 rating. But such are more of 
exceptions.  
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outflows and thereby disallow the subnational government to repay its foreign debts.  In short, 
the sovereign is unlikely to default before any subnational government. 
 
Since 2001, the rating agencies have changed their policies on the binding ceiling of sovereign 
rating on subnational ratings.  All three international rating agencies – Fitch, Moody’s and S&P 
– allow a subnational government (and other issuers domiciled within that country including 
corporate issuers) to enjoy a higher rating than the sovereign provided certain conditions are 
fulfilled.  Moody’s (2005) explains this policy shift in terms of the new interpretation of “transfer 
risk” (i.e., the inability of a debt issuer to convert local currency into foreign currency in order to 
meet external payment obligations in a timely manner) that a subnational government faces when 
a sovereign default occurs.  Prior to 2001, it was assumed that a moratorium on all foreign 
currency external payments (including debt servicing and repayment) of all issuers within that 
country would be automatically declared when a sovereign default happens.  However, the 
broadening and deepening of the international capital markets in the last decade (which provide 
subnational governments with more fiscal and financial options) and the practices of most 
governments facing external payment difficulties to avoid a generalized moratorium suggest that 
the assumption of an “automatic” generalized moratorium may no longer be relevant.  Instead, 
since June 2001, Moody’s said it would look at each situation individually to determine if certain 
subnational securities were eligible to pierce the country ceiling. 
 
In Moody’s rating process, how likely a subnational rating might pierce the sovereign ceiling 
depends firstly on its fundamental credit strength (as reflected in its local currency rating) and 
secondly on how probable a generalized moratorium would be in the event of a sovereign default 
(which was taken as an automatic outcome before 2001).  Thus, if the risk of a moratorium for 
the subnational debt following a sovereign default is near zero, then the subnational debt’s rating 
could be determined by its own credit strength and could follow that of its local currency rating.  
If on the other hand, the risk of a moratorium is high (e.g., close to 100 percent), then the 
sovereign rating will continue to act as the ceiling.  In other word, whether the sovereign rating 
will be a ceiling for the subnational ratings now becomes a probabilistic event. 
 
The probability of a moratorium being declared at the subnational level is in turn determined by 
a number of factors such as how integrated the subnational economy is with the global economy 
(the more integrated it is financially and commercially – especially if such integration is backed 
by legally enforceable contracts – the more difficult it is for the national government to impose a  
moratorium on the subnational debt); how costly the national government thinks the moratorium 
will be, in contrast with other policy alternatives (the more costly the moratorium is perceived to 
be, the less likely the national government will force a moratorium); and how willing the national 
government is to “socialize” the cost of the moratorium (i.e., how willing it is to face the rest of 
the world on behalf of the subnational governments and deal with other problems such as a sharp 
currency devaluation).  
 
S&P too has removed the automatic ceiling of sovereign rating for subnational ratings. In 
determining whether a subnational rating could pierce through the sovereign rating, it looks at 
the subnational’s fundamental credit strength as well as the financial autonomy it enjoys and the 
flexibility it has in resisting potential pressures from the national government (S&P 2008).  
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Fitch has removed the sovereign ceiling in the Euro area (Fitch 2006a).  However, its 
conclusions about rating subnationals above the sovereign rating are not limited to that area. The 
2006 report refers to experiences in Russia and Argentina in explaining "if, and how far, a local 
government can be rated above its national government" (page 2), and Fitch has selectively 
assigned ratings to subnational issuers higher than the sovereign rating. According to Fitch, the 
public sector obligations should not always be expected to default upon a sovereign default 
especially in highly decentralized environments.  Institutional recognition and fiscal/financial 
autonomy are the key conditions for a subnational to achieve a rating above its sovereign. 
 
Despite the change in the rating agencies’ “ceiling” policy, few subnational governments in the 
world are actually rated above the sovereign.  Gaillard (2006) found that as of December 1, 
2005, only the region of Lombardy and the Autonomous Province of Trento in Italy (both rated 
Aa1 by Moody’s) had been able to pierce through the sovereign ceiling of Aa2. Although there 
are other examples (as of January 2009, the City of Buenos Aires was rated B1 by Moody‘s and 
the Province of Mendoza was B2, both ratings higher than the B3 assigned to Argentina), the 
sovereign rating usually acts as a ceiling on subnational ratings today. 
The sovereign rating precedes the subnational ratings because the sovereign rating is needed to 
understand the economic, fiscal, and institutional context in which the subnational government is 
to be evaluated. Absent a sovereign rating, the data for rating the subnational government is 
incomplete. As Gaillard (2006) noted, since 1918, Moody’s has never issued a subnational rating 
unless the sovereign is already rated.  It is also not surprising then that changes in sovereign 
ratings are usually followed by similar adjustments in subnational ratings, especially in the 
emerging economies.  Often the change in ratings occurs within the same day. 
 
But even if the subnational governments are rated more highly than the sovereign, the gap is 
unlikely to be large as many aspects of the subnational creditworthiness are heavily influenced 
(and in many cases, constrained) by what happens politically and economically at the national 
level.  The national government could also severely restrict the fiscal flexibility that the 
subnational government has through the intergovernmental fiscal arrangements.  As Gaillard 
(2006) pointed out, on average, subnational ratings are only 1.65 and 2.05 notches below that of 
the sovereign in the Moody’s and the S&P ratings respectively, although the gaps are generally 
wider for emerging economies. 
4.2 Sovereign Influence on Subnational Borrowing 
The spread of the various subnational debts depends on the creditworthiness of individual 
subnational entities.  Nonetheless, given the “ceiling” effect noted above, the national 
government could enhance or reduce the subnational creditworthiness by various policies and 
regulations.  
The central government can enhance the creditworthiness by providing guarantees to specific 
debts issued by subnational governments.  This is usually done when a subnational’s borrowing 
is deemed to be important and yet the subnational’s credit standing is not strong enough to secure 
the funding or to do so with the right terms and conditions.  When the guarantee is provided, 
rating agencies and lenders will naturally focus on the credit standing of the national government 
and the nature of the guarantee including its enforceability, instead of the credit quality of the 
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subnational government.  The credit strength of the subnational government becomes a 
secondary issue. 
 
While a central government’s guarantee of subnational debt may enhance the credit ratings of the 
subnational entity, this could create moral hazard, as argued by Ianchovichina, Liu and 
Nagarajan (2007) and Liu and Waibel (2008a, 2008b). Expected bailouts by the central 
government influence subnational debt dynamics. Market participants may tolerate unsustainable 
subnational fiscal policy if past history backs their perception that the central government 
implicitly guarantees the debt service of the subnational government.  Many observers believe 
that the central government’s implicit guarantees for local government bailouts contributed to the 
widespread subnational defaults in Russia in the late 1990s and in Mexico in the mid-1990s.  
 
The national government could also reduce the subnational government’s borrowing capacity 
through various controls and restrictions.  Liu and Waibel (2008a) review the regulatory 
frameworks for subnational borrowing in several emerging countries; common elements across 
these countries include borrowing to finance capital investment only and quantitative limits on 
key fiscal variables such as debt service as a share of revenue or other measurements of capacity, 
primary balance, and debt stock outstanding. Foreign borrowing is either banned unless 
authorized by the national government (such as India and China) or carefully monitored (such as 
Colombia and Russia).  
 
Such controls could prevent excessive and reckless borrowing by the subnational government.  It 
could also indicate that the national government is willing to take strong measures to impose 
discipline on the subnational government to maintain certain risk management standards.  Major 
financial crises in the 1990s and early 2000s in Latin American can be attributed in part to 
excessive subnational borrowing and the national government’s assumption of such debt without 
imposing strong discipline.  The application of various limits on different subnational 
governments would likely force the latter to compete to adopt fiscally prudent practices, in order 
to receive a more favorable allocation.  If this is so, then the controls could potentially enhance 
the subnational government’s creditworthiness. 
 
However, an overly strict limit could cripple the subnational government’s ability to fund critical 
projects and block its access to new funds in times of emergency.  With the wide range of 
financial instruments available today, subnational governments may seek to circumvent the 
controls through creative ways of fund raising.  But doing so could sometimes lead to imprudent, 
distorting and less transparent forms of borrowing. 
 
How important the national controls and restrictions are on the subnational rating process 
depends on whether they translate to certain policy, institutional and management changes on the 
part of the subnational government.  For example, if the subnational governments are willing to 
respond to the borrowing restrictions by improving on their own fiscal and financial profiles so 
as to keep the need to borrow within the limit, or if they are willing to see the oversight from the 
national government as a form of fiscal discipline to improve their own risk management, then 
the effects of the controls and restrictions on subnational ratings are likely to be positive.   
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4.3 Sovereign Institutions and Policies as Constraints on Subnational Ratings 
The national government can directly affect the subnational ratings through the restrictions it 
places on the subnational government revenue and spending profiles.  The national government 
can affect the transfers to and the mandated spending of the subnational government.  It can also 
directly affect the economic conditions in and therefore the revenue base of the subnational 
economy. 
 
As analyzed by Ianchovichina, Liu and Nagarajan (2007), subnational fiscal and debt 
adjustment, fundamental to maintaining creditworthiness, is complicated by the respective 
legislative mandates of central vis-à-vis subnational governments and the intergovernmental 
finance system.  Such complications are manifested in a variety of ways.   
Subnational governments generally have no power to issue their own currency.  Thus, seignior 
age plays no role in government finance. The monetary policy of the national government also 
influences the base cost of borrowing for subnational governments.  Foreign exchange risk may 
not directly affect subnational finance, as in the case of China, India, and Peru where subnational 
governments have been prohibited from external borrowing without approval and guarantee from 
the national government.  However, currency risks can still indirectly impact the sustainability of 
subnationals’ fiscal policy through real interest rate shocks as in the case of the Mexican 
financial crisis in the mid-1990s.   
In many developing countries, subnational governments continue to depend heavily on fiscal 
transfers from the national government.  These may take the form of operating transfers, capital 
grants, formula-based revenue sharing and sometimes special arrangements such as 
reimbursement for certain deficit items.  In formula-based revenue sharing, the national 
government could transfer a proportion of its nationally-collected revenue (e.g., personal income 
tax and value-added tax) to the subnational governments. When the transfers are largely 
earmarked for specific expenditures, there is little that the subnational government can do to 
change its expenditure composition. Often, these subnational governments’ fiscal positions 
worsen because the central transfers cannot fully cover the subnational government’s mandated 
spending.  Indeed, it is common to observe especially in emerging economies that while 
spending may be decentralized, the revenue source at the subnational level is not enough to fund 
all the services. 
Subnational governments also face constraints in adjusting their own tax revenues.  In many 
countries these constraints are set by their respective constitutions and legislation on tax policy 
and administration. In India, the constitution allows the states to freely determine tax policy and 
tax rates within certain explicitly defined areas of taxation.  However, the taxation of the service 
sector is at within the purview of the central government, thus limiting the states’ ability in 
tapping revenue from the largest sector in many of the states.  
Furthermore, the national government can affect the fiscal sustainability of subnationals through 
policies which impact subnational primary balances and economic growth (these two variables 
together with real interest rate determine the subnational fiscal sustainability).  In many 
countries, investment policies and labor regulation are largely or exclusively within the purview 
of the national government. Policies on tax concessions and repatriation of foreign earnings for 
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example are often set at the national level and the national government may try to prevent 
excessive competition for foreign investment among various subnational regions.  
 
Similarly, policy measures designed to increase the subnational economy’s competitiveness such 
as specific incentives to promote certain industries often have to be coordinated with national 
industrial policies.  In some countries, the distribution of production activities is planned on a 
nationwide basis.  The subnational economy may be allocated a certain production function 
based on what the national government perceives to be its comparative advantage.  This could 
limit the subnational government’s ability to expand or diversify its production structure to attain 
greater competitiveness. 
 
As we noted in the earlier sections, in developing countries both the national and the subnational 
governments are still in the process of adjusting their fiscal relationships and renegotiations on 
revenue base and spending obligations could be more frequent.  Often, the balance in the 
intergovernmental relationships is driven by the relative political power between them and the 
strength of the political mandate that the subnational government enjoys.   
 
In many countries, the national government faces constraints on the overall consolidated budget 
deficit of all public sectors in the country, which include all national and subnational budgets.  
Indeed, there are times when subnationals have to trim their budget deficits or raise their budget 
surpluses to help meet certain national targets.  Such intergovernmental fiscal arrangements may 
hinder the subnational’s ability to carry out certain economic activities that are deemed 
beneficial to the local economy.   
4.4 Sovereign and Subnational Rating Criteria 
As Gaillard (2006) noted, another way to understand the relationship between sovereign and 
subnational ratings is to compare the rating criteria used in the two cases.  Both sovereign and 
subnational ratings are assessed using a framework that encompasses the political, economic, 
fiscal, financial and institutional factors.  This is not surprising since the natures of many 
functions and objectives of both governments are similar, which is to deliver a wide range of 
public services in a satisfactory manner within the fiscal limits set by direct or indirect taxes and 
fees levied on the residents.  Both ratings represent an opinion of the government’s ability to 
fulfill its debt obligations fully and on time while pursuing such objectives.  
Compared with the subnational rating process, however, political and economic variables play a 
much larger role in the sovereign process. In the S&P sovereign model, for example, 10 
categories of variables are examined, of which about five are of a politico-economic nature. For 
S&P subnational ratings, only one variable “economy” addresses specifically the local economic 
conditions while the political/governance issues are subsumed under the “system structure and 
management” category. That this is so may be attributed to the fact that key macroeconomic 
variables such as foreign exchange and monetary policies are within the purview of the central 
government.  
 
In both sovereign and subnational ratings, qualitative assessment plays a large role.  While a 
large number of quantitative measures such as the various debt and financial ratios and the 
various economic variables can be quantified, the political, social and institutional contexts 
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within which the economic and fiscal forces play out cannot be quantified.  Yet, insights into 
such variables are often more important especially in gauging the government’s “willingness”, 
not just “ability”, to fulfill its debt obligations.  In this regard, qualitative assessment is even 
more important at the sovereign level than at the subnational level since the subnational 
governments possess far less financial flexibility than the sovereign government and as Gaillard 
noted, in the event of a default, they may not be in a position to call for a restructuring of debt. 
On the other hand, subnational governments may have greater leverage in obtaining bailouts 
from the national government through political negotiations.  Since the late 1990s, countries such 
as Brazil and South Africa have been moving toward an insolvency framework imposing a hard 
budget constraint on subnational governments (Liu and Waibel 2008b).   
5. Methodological Changes in Credit Ratings 
Rating methodologies are not static; they change in scope and emphasis in response to the 
changing structure of the entities being rated. The main change in the last decade in subnational 
credit ratings is the shift toward a balance-sheet approach and the emphasis on contingent 
liabilities.  The increased use by subnational governments of indirect debt instruments such as 
public-private partnerships, off-budget financing of fiscal deficit, capital leases, and 
securitization has led to their increased importance in the overall risk matrix of the rating 
agencies.  
 
The current financial crisis has further consolidated the emphasis on the liquidity and debt 
management of subnational governments, including indirect debt of quasi-public companies and 
other implicit or contingent liabilities such as guarantees and contracts for public-private 
partnerships.  Prior to the financial crisis, liquidity and debt profiles of subnational governments 
were already essential components of the rating criteria used by the rating agencies. The 
financial crisis has brought about an even sharper focus on these components.  
5.1 Shift toward a Balance-Sheet Approach   
According to Liu and Waibel (2008a), contingent liabilities were a major source of subnational 
fiscal deterioration in many developing countries, quietly eroding the financial health of 
subnational governments, thereby leading to the sudden onset of fiscal crises without warning. 
Among Indian states in the late 1990s, special-purpose vehicles became a convenient way of 
circumventing tight budgets. Guarantees by states to support market borrowing of loss-making 
public sector undertakings, a contingent liability, grew rapidly. In Brazil, state-owned enterprises 
and banks contributed to the fiscal deterioration of states in the 1990s. Though off-budget 
subnational borrowing through municipal infrastructure investment companies has contributed to 
the rapid development of urban infrastructure in China, potential implicit liabilities have become 
a key concern. In Poland, debt incurred by local government-owned hospitals is not counted as 
direct debt of local governments but according to Fitch (2008c), the financial losses of the 
hospitals are contingent liabilities of local governments, hence the debt is counted as the indirect 
debt by Fitch.   
In addition to off-budget liabilities of special-purpose vehicles and opaque transactions between 
subnational governments and their enterprises, there are other sources of hidden or contingent 
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liabilities that are not reported in or captured by published fiscal accounts. Growing subnational 
civil-servant pension liabilities under the pay-as-you-go system have been a serious and growing 
threat to subnational financial health in Brazil and India. Nonperforming assets of banks owned 
by subnational governments in Argentina and Brazil partly explained subnational debt crises in 
the 1990s. Furthermore, the cash-reporting system systematically underestimates the financial 
liabilities of subnational governments in many developing countries. The cash-accounting 
system does not capture arrears to suppliers, contractors, or central government agencies or 
delayed payments of civil-servant wages and pensions (Liu and Waibel 2008a). 
Although rating agencies have shifted toward a balance-sheet approach to better capture these 
contingent liabilities, in general, the subnational rating criteria still encompass the same five 
major components mentioned earlier: sovereign factors, economic conditions, fiscal position, 
financial position, institutional and management matters.  Instead of expansion, however, there 
has actually been some consolidation process.  In the S&P framework, the number of category 
was consolidated from six to five, with “system structure and management” addressing the issues 
that were previously listed in two separate categories: “intergovernmental relationship” and 
“subnational government’s administrative system”.  Moody’s too, combined the budgetary 
framework and budgetary performance into one category (budgetary performance) and reduced 
the number of categories from six to five.  At Fitch, the new rating framework is made up of five 
components, down from eight in the past.25   
While the set of subnational rating criteria used may not have expanded, the relative emphasis 
that rating agencies place on individual variables has changed to reflect the different rating 
priorities in the new environment.  This can be seen in the way that the variables are arranged 
and grouped together in the new ratings approach.  For example, in the S&P rating criteria, the 
contingent liabilities are now given much more prominence with a separate category of off-
balance-sheet liabilities.  In Moody’s too, contingent liabilities are now a major component 
under “debt profile” and are given a more detailed and careful treatment than previously.  
Similar, “indirect risks” (off-balance-sheet and contingent liabilities) plays a much greater role in 
Fitch rating now than in the past.  Not only does the rating agency pay greater attention to the 
interpretation of these risks, it also covers a much wider set of issues. 
 
All rating agencies have a strong emphasis on off-balance sheet. S&P defines off-balance-sheet 
liabilities to include the total debt from all public sector enterprises (e.g., banks, utilities, and 
housing companies) and other contingent obligations such as social obligations, public private 
partnerships and bailout of private companies.  The subnational government is evaluated on its 
ability to continuously and carefully monitor the financial health and profitability of all public 
sector enterprises, as well as the clarity it provides on the likelihood that it will be called upon to 
honor its guarantee to these enterprises. 
                                                 
25 One reason why the subnational rating criteria have not been similarly expanded as the sovereign criteria is that 
the newly highlighted variables post Asia crisis are seen to be more “sovereign” than subnational in nature.  Their 
impact on subnational ratings is already captured in the existing category called “sovereign factors”.  Thus, if 
excessive private foreign debts undermine the confidence in the sovereign rating, the subnational ratings will likely 
be adjusted through the typical “capping” relationship.  At the subnational level, even if local private enterprises 
encounter difficulties servicing their foreign debts, the risk to the subnational creditworthiness is limited unless the 
subnational government has extended implicit or explicit guarantees to these enterprises.  The risk is one of 
contingent liability rather than exchange rate. 
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In Moody’s methodology, contingent liabilities (known as “indirect risks”) make up a distinct 
component of the “debt profile” in the rating criteria, separate from the “direct debt” of the 
subnational government.  Moody’s reviews those liabilities that may not be consolidated in the 
financial statement of a subnational government, such as guarantees issued by the subnational 
government, debt obligations of majority-owned enterprises even not explicitly guaranteed by 
the subnational government, and public private partnerships.  
 
Fitch, too, places a lot of emphasis on the importance of managing “indirect risks”.  It considers 
lack of information on indirect risk a negative credit factor.  Indeed, Fitch uses different 
approaches to try to gauge the seriousness of the off-balance-sheet liabilities such as off-balance-
sheet project financing, lease obligations, debt guarantees, and equity interests and liabilities in 
utilities, businesses and banks. Fitch tracks past occurrences of the subnational government 
assuming the debt of agencies and companies; large unexpected transfers to companies and 
agencies; large transfers from companies to the subnational government (which may imply 
financial dependency); and the importance the services provided to the residents by certain 
companies.   
 
Though we noted above that the estimate of the fiscal costs arising from a systemic distress may 
be more relevant to the sovereign than to the subnational government, the focus on “asset 
quality” that such estimates of system risks brings about is part of the rating culture at the 
subnational level.  Subnational governments are expected to closely monitor the quality of their 
assets and how they may change with the market environment.  The ability to maintain the asset 
quality through active management of its investment portfolios and assets is seen as positive for 
the subnational’s creditworthiness.   
5.2   Focus on Liquidity and Debt Profile 
With the shift in the general rating orientation towards a more balance-sheet based approach, 
rating agencies do not assess the credit risks of a subnational government only in terms of the 
strength of the local economy and the flows of revenues and expenditures.  An increasingly 
larger part of the assessment is now based on the analysis of the subnational’s financial position, 
fiscal balance position, the structures of the debt (especially the maturity structure), and the 
exposures to various financial risks, interest rate risks and currency risks, and so on.    
 
All rating agencies now pay considerable attention to the subnational’s liquidity position, its cash 
management ability as well as the ability to service short-term debt in the context of various 
market risks.  Indeed, the strong focus on liquidity and reserve adequacy may be seen as a direct 
outcome of the Asia financial crisis.  The misplaced emphasis on the “months of imports”, rather 
than debt servicing capacity, as a measure of reserve adequacy in the pre-Asia crisis days was 
widely seen to have contributed to the outbreak of the crisis.  
 
In the S&P methodology, for example, there is a strong focus on the minimum reserves that the 
subnational government maintains.  These are defined in terms of their ability to meet not just 
expenditures but also debt service demands.  Particular attention is given to the servicing of 
short-term variable-rate debts or bonds with bullet maturities.  A heavy and consistent reliance 
on short-term debt or debt with irregular maturity is seen as a negative for the subnational’s 
credit standing.  Moody’s, too, places a lot of emphasis on the subnational’s ability to manage 
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short-term debt exposures.  The subnational’s ability to service the debt is assessed in terms of 
both internal and external liquidity.  Market access risk (i.e., the ability to access external 
liquidity in the market) is an important consideration in evaluating the subnational 
creditworthiness. 
 
Debt profile analysis is also a critical part of the rating process in Fitch.  Good credit standing 
requires a debt structure that has “moderate and predictable debt service, with minimal reliance 
on refinancing and no deferral of principal repayment” (Fitch, 2008a, p.5).  It considers it 
negative for subnational creditworthiness if scheduled debt repayment could not be met within 
the annual budget constraints and has to rely on future revenue growth, future economic growth, 
nonrecurring revenues, increased taxes or future legislative actions.  
 
The emphasis on liquidity and debt management and off-balance-sheet liabilities have been 
reinforced by the ongoing financial crisis.  Fitch’s category of “debt and indirect risk” has been 
expanded to become “debt, liquidity and indirect risk.”   It highlights that balloon or bullet 
maturities or a large portion of short-term debt indicates refinancing risk.  Its July 2008 update 
included two new debt indicators compared with the October 2006 guidelines: debt to current 
revenue and direct risk (direct debt plus indirect debt) to current revenue.   
Moody’s updated rating methodology for subnational governments (2008) introduced a 
recalibration of the debt sub-factors. It altered the debt burden ratio to include in the numerator 
capital lease, debt issued by majority-owned enterprises, public-private partnerships and 
securitization transactions for which the government is or may become responsible. It also 
increased the weight assigned to this ratio and introduced a new criterion, the four-year trend, to 
better measure the underlying shifts in debt burden.   
In its updated methodology, S&P (2009) introduced the valuation of use of derivative 
instruments. S&P will analyze the subnational entity’s objectives in entering these contracts 
(hedging, trading and cost reduction), the type of risk they are designed to mitigate, the extent of 
their use, management’s risk appetite, and the control procedures in place. In key ratios relating 
to liquidity and debt management, S&P also added liquid assets, in addition to cash, to measure 
the ability to finance debt service and other operating expenditures.   
5.3   Shift in Sovereign Rating Methodology 
The shift toward a balance-sheet approach in subnational rating coincided with a similar shift in 
sovereign rating over the same period, though the underlying risks and contingent liabilities 
differ.  While the subnational risk lies with off-balance-sheet financing and quasi public debt, the 
sovereign risk relates to contingent liabilities from the corporate and financial sectors through the 
linkage of exchange rate, external accounts, and monetary policies.  
The rating agencies shifted their sovereign rating from one that focused largely on analyzing the 
“macro-fundamentals” to one that is more “balance-sheet” oriented.  Before the Asia crisis, 
sovereign rating focused largely on macroeconomic fundamentals, with limited attention given to 
issues such as the government’s international liquidity position, its contingent liabilities and 
more generally the asset quality in the economy.  The focal point of the external balance was the 
current account position, with little attention paid to capital account developments. Corporate, 
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banking and financial sector issues were not the main concerns.  Indeed, measured in terms of 
these macro-fundamentals, most Asian countries appeared to be exposed to only moderate risks 
(principally the current account deficits and the relatively low level of imports that their foreign 
reserves could sustain) before the crisis. 
Bhatia (2002) provides an excellent account of the changes in sovereign rating methodology 
prompted by the Asia financial crisis.  Using the sovereign rating framework of S&P as an 
example, he noted that the methodological changes occur on at least two fronts: firstly, a re-
organization of the existing ratings framework or “ramp” as he terms it; and secondly, a shift in 
the basic orientation of the rating approach.   
 
On reorganization of rating framework, the change took the form of “greater specificity in 
methodology to better ensure the comprehensiveness of committee deliberations; and stricter 
conformity with the scoring guidelines to better protect the comparability of the ramp scores”.26  
For example, the number of categories used in S&P’s ratings analysis was considerably 
expanded.  An additional fiscal score was added to quantify off-budget and contingent liabilities.  
This new score seeks to reflect more accurately the off-budget financial support provided by the 
national government to various public and private sector entities.  
 
At the same time, a combined score for external debt was split into two separate scores, for 
public and private sector external debt respectively.  This was deemed necessary because the 
Asia crisis was sparked off partly by excessive off-shore borrowing in the private sector, rather 
than the public sector which is typically the case in other emerging economies especially Latin 
America.  Between April 1997 and April 2002, the total number of categories considered in 
S&P’s sovereign ratings analysis was raised from eight to ten, with the addition of public sector 
net external debt and bank and private sector net external debt (Bhatia 2002). 
 
The changes in the following two areas are particularly noticeable: new and stronger focus on the 
sovereign international liquidity position; and heavy emphasis on corporate leverage and its 
linkages to financial, fiscal and external risks.  Thus, while the old approach measures the 
adequacy of foreign reserves (international liquidity) in terms of the number of months of 
imports they can support, the new approach does so in terms of its relation to repayment of short-
term external debt, financing gaps and money supply, etc.  It also looks into questions such as 
how inadequacy of reserves may trigger refinancing risks. 
  
Whereas the old approach paid scant attention to the trend in corporate leverage, the new 
approach tries to assess its implications for the risks in the banking and financial sector.  For 
example, how excessive borrowing by the corporate sector may expose it to interest rate and 
exchange rate risks, how this could result in a sharp rise in non-performing loans, affect the asset 
quality in the economy, cause wide-spread bankruptcy and banking failure and ultimately call for 
bank recapitalization that would have to be funded in large parts through fiscal means.  Massive 
                                                 
26 Bhatia (2002), p.48.  
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bank recapitalization was a major factor that turned the fiscal surpluses in most Asian economies 
before the crisis to sharp fiscal deficits in the years after the crisis.27 
6.  Challenges of Subnational Ratings in Developing Countries 
Developing a system of subnational credit ratings is predicated on the development of the 
subnational capital market. An accurate assessment of risks associated with a new type of debt 
requires several years of experience with a significant amount of issuance. Subnational credit 
ratings in developing countries have a relatively short history and in some countries have just 
begun. The link between ratings and spreads is not yet established in a country with a small 
amount of issuance.28     
Subnational borrowing from the capital market in developing countries is in early stage of 
development, mainly because the supporting infrastructures are not as favorable as in developed 
economies.  For example, a strong and credible legal and regulatory framework needed to 
maintain investor confidence in the repayment process is often not present.  Neither is there 
sufficient clarity on the fiscal capacity, the liabilities and the borrowing powers of subnational 
governments.  
Furthermore, the credibility of ratings can be assured only if certain preconditions in the political 
and institutional environments are already met.  A subnational government may receive a 
favorable or unfavorable credit rating depending on its economic, fiscal and financial strengths.  
But whatever the strengths in these areas may be, the rating accorded to the subnational 
government is unlikely to be taken seriously by investors if there are considerable policy 
uncertainties and doubts about the strength and quality of the institutions and systems within 
which the credit analysis is conducted.  Institutional and system credibility is a critical 
precondition for creditworthiness analysis.  In this context, the following issues deserve to be 
highlighted. 
6.1  Uncertainty and Risk 
A main challenge for rating subnational or sovereign arises from the fact that qualitative factors 
and subjective judgment play an important and integral part in the rating process.  These 
qualitative variables cannot be reduced to a set of ratios or mathematical formulas and as such 
may not be seen to have the same degree of ‘rigor” and “objectivity’ of the process.  Indeed, 
given that the final rating accorded to a subnational entity is often a result of benchmarking (with 
other subnational entities with similar creditworthiness) by the rating committee, there is 
inevitably a large element of subjectivity in the rating process.  
                                                 
27 Another event affecting rating methodologies in recent years was the corporate frauds in the U.S. that took place 
in the early 2000s.  The Enron scandal in particular exposed the rating agencies’ failures to pay careful attention to 
the financial accounts of companies.  The ongoing financial crisis is also expected to lead to changes in the rating 
system for financial institutions and financial instruments such as mortgage-backed securities. Criticism of the rating 
agency role in the current financial crisis relates mainly to structured finance ratings and banks, and not to 
subnational government ratings. 
28 This paragraph benefitted from a discussion with George Peterson. 
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The committee will have to ensure that the rating accorded to a subnational government fits in 
meaningfully with the whole universe of subnational governments that the rating agency has 
rated.  The rating of a subnational government within Argentina, for example, will have to be 
consistent not only with those of other Argentine subnational governments but also subnational 
governments in other emerging economies that are in a similar state of development as 
Argentina.  At the same time, the rating committee has to ensure that changing creditworthiness 
conditions over time in all the rated subnational entities are taken into account.  As Bhatia (2002) 
noted, shifting peer comparison is often necessary, and “although the ratings are measured of 
absolute creditworthiness, in practice, the rating exercise is highly comparative in nature” (p. 
12). 
 
Qualitative factors and subjective judgment have a role in the rating process for issuers both in 
the developed and developing countries. The objective data are evaluated in light of the 
possibility that some other factor – a changed legal framework, a different revenue allocation, a 
new spending responsibility – may be introduced and put the past patterns at risk. Such other 
factors are more acute in emerging markets.  
 
The policy making process is often less transparent and the likelihood of frequent policy changes 
much stronger in developing countries than in developed countries. There is a much higher 
degree of variability in policy outcome.  Such variability is often driven by the changing balance 
of political power (both across regions and within the same subnational entity) and changing 
personalities at the policy-making scene.  A good understanding of the policy-making 
environment and the personnel involved is therefore critical to the assessment of the subnational 
creditworthiness in developing countries.  Because these factors add to uncertainty and risk, the 
rating agencies respond by assigning ratings that incorporate the added uncertainty. 
 
Many developing countries started decentralization only in the 1990s, and the intergovernmental 
fiscal system is still going through adjustment, sorting out revenue allocation and spending 
responsibilities, and redefining the legal framework.  In countries where the intergovernmental 
fiscal arrangements change unpredictably, where policy reversals are regular occurrences, and 
where the subnational government often has to contend with one-off changes in transfers and 
spending responsibilities, it would be difficult to make reliable medium-term forecasts of the 
subnational government’s fiscal capacity and hence credit ratings. In some countries where the 
intergovernmental transfers are based on some formula, on-going periodical negotiations 
between the governments are a rule rather than an exception. Often, the outcome of the 
negotiations is driven by the relative political powers of the tiers of governments. 29   
 
Continuously evolving legal and regulatory frameworks create uncertainties about the binding 
nature of the commercial agreements and covenants of the subnational debt.  Laws on 
subnational debt repayments are often not sufficiently clarified.  In some countries, laws are 
changed without respect for grandfathering or protection of existing contracts signed under the 
previous legal framework.  More generally, the irrevocability of the security pledge may be 
called into question when the local government faces fiscal crisis.30 
 
                                                 
29 This part draws heavily from S&P (2004).  
30 For a review of cross-country experiences in subnational insolvency mechanisms, see Liu and Waibel (2008b). 
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Lack of management sophistication and institutional strength is another key concern. In many 
emerging economies, the strength of the institutions and the credibility of the management are 
still being developed. Frequent turnover of key policy makers and administrators following 
change of political powers renders it difficult to have policy continuity and the time needed to 
see through major reforms and other changes.  The absence of checks and balances and the 
presence of corrupt practices can undermine the credibility of the subnational government.  Lack 
of sophistication in financial and budgetary systems make them vulnerable to changes in external 
conditions. 
 
6.2  Financial Reporting, Accounting Systems and Disclosure Standards 
In many emerging economies, the financial reports of the subnational government are typically 
produced in a form that satisfies the requirements of the national government (or other higher 
levels of government like provincial government).  Neither these reports nor the accounting 
principles and practices employed may meet the demands of the capital market for credit risk 
assessment purposes.  For instance, one-time exceptional revenues may be treated in the same 
way as recurring revenues; there may not be a sufficient distinction between cash and accrual 
accounting principles; and capital expenditures may not be sufficiently distinguished from 
operating expenditures.  Sometimes, new borrowing is treated as “revenue” to balance the 
budget.  Such practices make it difficult to use these financial reports as a basis for an assessment 
of subnational risks and creditworthiness. 
The lack of consistent historical data poses a challenge for forecasting fiscal capacity. A basic 
requirement in creditworthiness analysis is the availability of a five-year record of economic 
performance and financial reports, but resource constraints make it difficult for many subnational 
governments to maintain a comprehensive set of data in a consistent manner.  For example, 
many important data such as unemployment rates and changing demographic profiles – both of 
which have grave implications for the subnational government’s fiscal burdens – are either not 
available or not collected over time in a consistent manner.   
 
In general, but more specifically for a subnational government that is above a certain threshold 
size, the financial reports should be subjected to independent auditing and made available to the 
public. A strong culture of disclosure and transparency is necessary to maintain investor 
confidence in the soundness of the subnational government’s financial position. In many 
developing countries, the process is constrained by the absence of such an auditing culture and 
independent, high quality third-party auditors in these countries.   
 
Often, inadequate attention is paid to the treatment of off-balance and contingent liabilities either 
because the legal system is ill-equipped to deal with these liabilities or because of negligence of 
the subnational government.  Many subnational governments do not have a clear estimate of 
their pension liabilities.  In some emerging economies, subnational governments grant 
enterprises or entities it owns flexibility in providing concessions to private companies in a bid to 
attract investments.  Or the government may undertake to guarantee concessions made to these 
private companies.  Such undertakings could present tremendous financial burden to the 
government in the future. 
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The absence of well-trained, let alone experienced professionals in various fields such as 
accounting, audit, legal and finance presents a major challenge for subnational governments in 
developing countries that intend to tap the capital markets and comply with international best 
practices.  These experienced professionals are needed not only to help in the preparation of the 
debt issuance but also to ensure that the subnational government maintains a certain level of 
creditworthiness over time.      
 
The management culture and the mindset of the staff working for the subnational government are 
just as, if not more, important than the “hardware” of personnel and data in determining its 
creditworthiness.  The organization must be imbued with the professionalism that is expected by 
the market and investors.  Corrupt practices or the willingness to succumb to political and other 
external pressures will undermine the credibility of the rating process.  The mere employment of 
highly experienced professional risk managers working with a comprehensive set of financial 
data will not guarantee financial soundness for the subnational government unless the integrity of 
the management team can be assured. 
7.  Conclusions 
In developing countries, subnational borrowing from the capital market has been on the rise.  
With the global trend of fiscal decentralization and large demand for infrastructure investments, 
such borrowing, and with it the need for subnational credit ratings, is set to rise further, 
notwithstanding the impact of the current financial crisis on subnational credit markets. 
Furthermore, subnational credit ratings have been an element of broad reform toward subnational 
fiscal sustainability in countries such as China, Colombia, and Mexico. Yet little synthesis work 
has been done so far on how international rating agencies undertake the rating process.  
Increased awareness of the rating process among policymakers and borrowers is essential in 
facilitating subnational borrowing that is sustainable and a broad and diversified subnational 
credit market.  
 
This paper surveys the methodological issues involved in subnational credit ratings and 
highlights the key challenges that could hinder the rating process, especially among developing 
countries.  A few messages emerge from our discussion.  First, improving the underlying credit 
conditions of the rated subnationals is of paramount importance.  The ratings frameworks used 
by the major established rating agencies are very similar.  All of them focus on the underlying 
fundamentals of the rated entities.  It is highly unlikely for a subnational entity with poor credit 
conditions to be rated much higher by one rating agency relative to another. 
 
Second, the creditworthiness of the sovereign and the fiscal and financial relationships between 
the central and subnational governments are among the most critical elements of the rating 
criteria.  The sovereign conditions affect the subnational creditworthiness in many ways.  It is 
extremely unlikely for a subnational entity to be rated highly if the sovereign conditions are 
weak and/or the fiscal and financial arrangements between the two levels of government are 
poorly constituted. 
 
Third, implicit and contingent liabilities are integral to the rating process. Such indirect debt 
instruments can circumvent fiscal rules intended to promote prudent practices. The indirect debt 
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can take a variety of forms such as public-private partnerships, off-budget financing of fiscal 
deficit, capital leases, and securitizations; it is also more difficult to establish accounting and 
disclosure requirements for these. The ongoing financial crisis has further reinforced the rating 
focus on the management of liquidity, debt structure, and off-balance-sheet liabilities. 
 
Fourth, subnational credit ratings are predicated on the development of subnational capital 
markets. Such development confronts several challenges in developing countries: higher 
variability in policy outcomes, uncertainties in institutional and policy frameworks, and 
inadequate accounting, auditing and disclosure standards. Thus, subnational credit ratings are a 
part of broader reform – developing a transparent budgetary and financial management system, 
establishing standardized accounting, auditing and reporting, and improving policy frameworks 
and intergovernmental fiscal system.      
 
Capital market financing of infrastructure is expected to continue to grow and compete with bank 
lending among the developing countries over the long term.  But such growth should not be 
allowed to pose unnecessary risks to the international capital market and the financial health of 
borrowers and the lenders.  In this context, there must be greater awareness of what makes sound 
subnational creditworthiness.  Multilateral agencies such as the World Bank, the IMF and the 
Asia Development Bank can play a much more active role in disseminating knowledge and in 
raising the capacity of both lenders and borrowers to understand the rating process.  The rating 
agencies should also make more transparent the rating criteria they use, especially on the more 
“qualitative” components of the rating criteria. 
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ANNEXES 
Table 1. Rating Scale 
 
 S&P Moody Fitch 
Investment 
Grade 
AAA Aaa AAA 
AA+ 
AA 
AA- 
Aa1 
Aa2 
Aa3 
AA+ 
AA 
AA- 
A+ 
A 
A- 
A1 
A2 
A3 
A+ 
A 
A- 
BBB+ 
BBB 
BBB- 
Baa1 
Baa2 
Baa3 
BBB+ 
BBB 
BBB- 
Speculative 
Grade 
BB+ 
BB  
BB- 
Ba1 
Ba2 
Ba3 
BB+ 
BB 
BB- 
B+ 
B 
B- 
B1 
B2 
B3 
B+ 
B 
B- 
CCC+ 
CCC 
CCC- 
Caa1 
Caa2 
Caa3 
CCC 
CC 
C 
CC & C   
Default/ Distressed 
SD & D Ca 
C 
DDD 
DD 
D 
Source: Moody’s, 2004; S&P, 2004; and Fitch, 2002. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Average Cumulative Issuer-Weighted 
Global Corporate Default Rates, 1920-2007 
 Percentage after … 
Rating 5 Years 10 Years 20 Years 
Aaa 0.163 0.897 1.828 
Aa 0.704 2.294 5.265 
A 1.116 2.901 6.333 
Baa 3.142 7.061 12.912 
Ba 9.587 18.435 30.779 
B 
Caa-C 
21.425 
37.638 
33.929 
48.981 
45.375 
67.133 
Investment 1.687 4.076 8.004 
Speculative 16.714 26.827 39.279 
Source: Moody’s (2008c). 
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Table 3. International Rating Methodology for Local and Regional Governments  
Fitch Ratings, Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s 
 
FITCH RATINGS 
1. Institutional and Administrative 
 Amount of the transfers and their relative size  in the subnational’s operating revenues 
 Type of transfers 
 Revenue sources legally delegated to subnationals 
 Flexibility to adjust revenue budget to changing economic environment 
 The legal and political risks associated with any national revenue sharing system and direction 
of any changes 
 The size and type of mandated expenditure 
 Sources and types of expenditure finance (user charges, fees, taxes, or earmarked revenues) 
 Expenditure flexibility 
 Socio-economic trends underpinning the demand for public services (if population growth is 
straining the supply of public services) 
2.  Economic and Social Profile 
 Economic base and diversity 
 Employment type 
 Demographic profile and trends; population growth 
 Size, type, strategic location of subnational economy, its relative importance e.g., capital city, 
regional center etc. 
 Basic economic infrastructure 
3.  Fiscal and Budgetary Performance 
 Revenue flexibility; diversity, and autonomy to raise taxes 
 Financial statements and their disclosure 
 Independent audits 
 Trends for each major revenue and expenditure (over the period of five years), operating results 
and liquidity position and revenue structure 
 Flow to and from entity-owned enterprises, intergovernmental revenue sharing 
 Budget forecasts and macro projections  
 Subnational’s budget, capital plans and funding sources 
4. Debt, Liquidity and Indirect Risk 
 Debt structure (long term & short term), instruments and a purpose of the debt 
 Rollover and refinancing risks (debt service, maturity, foreign exchange, etc) 
 Overall debt burden (outstanding, proposed and future indebtedness) 
 Debt structure (off balance sheet, lease obligations, debt guarantees, equity interests and 
liabilities) 
 Debt Burden measures: 
  Debt principle relative to local GDP and population 
  Debt to current revenue 
  Direct risk (direct debt plus ) to current revenues 
  Debt to current balance (payback ratio) 
  Debt principal relative to estimated market value of taxable property 
  Debt service as a percentage of current revenues and annual operating expenses  
  Debt per capita 
  Annual pension liabilities as a percentage of current operating expenses 
 Indirect debt risk from public enterprises (e.g., financial and liquidity risks of non-consolidated 
entities, large unexpected transfers from subnational and central governments, obligations to 
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offer assistance in crisis. 
5. Management 
 Accounting policies 
 Multi-year forecasting 
 Debt affordability 
 Debt management 
 Risks disclosure practices 
 Source: Fitch (2008a) 
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MOODY’S 
 
 
Developing 
countries 
weighting 
1. Operating environment  60% 
 GDP per capita USD (three years average in PPP terms) 50% 
 GDP volatility (%) 25% 
 Government Effectiveness Index 25% 
2. The institutional framework that determines RLG powers and 
responsibilities 
10% 
 Predictability, stability and responsiveness 50% 
 Fiscal flexibility (gouging separately revenue and expenditure flexibility) 33.4% 
 Fiscal adequacy 16.6% 
3. Financial position and performance 7.5% 
 Interest Payments / Operating Revenues (%) 25% 
 Cash Financing Surplus / Total Revenue (%) 25% 
 Gross Operating Balance / Operating Revenue (%) 25% 
 Net Working Capital* / Total Expenditures (%)  25% 
4. Debt profile 7.5% 
 Net Direct and Indirect Debt/Operating Revenues (%) 50% 
 Short Term Direct Debt /Direct Debt (%) 25% 
 Four Year Trend in Net Direct and Indirect Debt / Operating Revenue (%) 25% 
5. Governance and management practices 7.5% 
 Fiscal Management 40% 
 Investment and Debt Management 20% 
 Transparency and Disclosure – financial statement disclosure 15% 
 Transparency and Disclosure -audit 15% 
 Institutional Capacity  10% 
6. Economic fundamentals 7.5% 
 GDP per capita (USD, PPP), Estimated 
Source: Moody’s (2008a) 
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STANDARD & POOR’S 
1. Economy 
 Demographics/Population  
 (total and as a % of national population; growth rates; % of young and 
elderly population) 
 Economic Structure 
 GDP (nominal and output) 
Employment (rate; distribution by sector; by largest employers) 
Unemployment rates 
 Wealth 
 Per capita GDP and as % of national or regional average 
 Growth prospects 
 Real GDP growth 
Exports as a % of GDP, and export growth 
Investment growth (year on year) % 
2. System Support and Predictability 
 Predictability of political and administrative system, intergovernmental relations, public sector 
reforms 
 Revenue/expenditure match (tax, equalization, central government financial assistance, 
expenditure mandates 
 Legal framework and formal/informal rules regarding transparency and accountability 
 Fiscal policy framework including legal restrictions on debt and financial policy 
 Extraordinary support from other levels of government 
3. Management Sophistication and Institutional Legitimacy 
 Transparency and disclosure 
 Budgeting 
 Long term capital and financial planning 
 Revenue and expenditure management 
 Debt management 
 Reserve and liquidity management 
 Management of government related entities 
4. Financial Flexibility 
 Legal limits on fiscal flexibility 
 Political and competitive limits on flexibility 
 Limits on flexibility due to future spending requirements 
 Other potential sources of pressure and one-off revenues 
 Modifiable revenues as a % of operating revenues 
Capital expenditure as a % of total expenditure 
Personnel as a % of operating expenditures 
Operating expenditure growth (%) 
Operating revenue growth (%) 
5. Budgetary Performance 
 Budgetary Performance 
  Operating Balance / Operating Revenues (%) 
Balance after capital expenditures/ Total Revenues (%) 
Balance after borrowing/ Total Revenues (%) 
6. Liquidity and Debt Management 
 Liquidity analysis  
  Free cash and liquid assets as % of debt service 
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Free cash, liquid assets, committed facilities as % of debt service 
Debt maturing within 12 months as a % of self liquidity and committed 
facilities 
Free cash and liquid assets as % of operating expenditures 
Cash operating surplus / interest expenditures 
Payables as a % of total expenditures 
Receivables as a % of total revenues 
 Debt management 
 Interest rate/ currency/ counterparty risks 
 Use of derivatives 
7. Debt Burden 
  Interest payments as a % of operating revenues 
Debt service as a % of operating revenues 
Direct debt as a % of operating revenues 
Net direct debt as a% of operating revenues 
Net tax supported debt as a % of consolidated operating revenues 
Net financial liabilities as % consolidated operating revenues 
Direct debt as a % of local GDP 
Total public sector debt as a % of combined public sector revenues 
Direct debt plus guaranteed debt, as a % of operating revenues 
8. Off balance sheet liabilities 
 Financial health of public enterprises  
 Quasi- government programs  
 Public-private partnerships  
 Bailout of private companies  
 Source: Standard & Poor’s (2009) 
 
